Mind the time: Puzzles of temporal cognition
Tuesday, 14th April, 2026
John Carr Design Suite - C29; Portobello Centre; Pitt Street, S1 4ET
The University of Sheffield
Tuesday, 14th April, 2026
John Carr Design Suite - C29; Portobello Centre; Pitt Street, S1 4ET
The University of Sheffield
From catching a ball to crossing the street, temporal cognition (i.e., the capacity to experience and think about time) plays a central function in our lives. Yet, several foundational questions concerning temporal cognition and its role in our mental economy remain open: What does it mean that we experience events as unfolding in time? What is the relationship between time and consciousness? How does temporal cognition shape our emotional experiences?
This workshop, sponsored by the Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies and open to the public, will explore these and related, fascinating questions in the philosophy and cognitive science of time. The workshop will also host the second Distinguished Hang Seng Centre Public Lecture.
Programme
(Each talk will last 45 minutes, followed by a 45-minute Q&A session).
10:30-12:00. Giuliano Torrengo (Università degli Studi di Milano).
“What does it mean to believe that time does not pass?”
12:00-13:30. Lunch break.
13:30-15:00. Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris).
“3A perception: Anticipatory, affective, action-oriented”.
[Distinguished Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies Public Lecture]
15:00-15:15. Coffee Break.
15:15-16:45. Gerardo Viera (University of Sheffield).
“Time and the unity of consciousness”.
Abstracts
F. de Vignemont. 3A perception: Anticipatory, affective, action-oriented.
The future location of the potential manifestation of a dispositional property is typically left indeterminate: the fragile glass may break at any time, given the right circumstances. Its fragility has to do with the possibility of its breaking, not with a specific event of breaking in the future. Likewise, when one thinks of lions as dangerous to humans, one believes that they can kill us, but this evaluation remains detached from any temporal location. However, when an impala sees a lion approaching, it does not respond to a timeless notion of danger, merely representing that the lion can kill. The impala anticipates that it will be killed if it doesn’t run away. In this talk, I will explore the role of both affective and perceptual anticipations in threat perception and argue that seeing danger is oriented towards the future qua the future.
G. Torrengo. What does it mean to believe that time does not pass?
Traditionally, passage antirealists (aka B-theorists) have refused to take seriously their opponents’ complaints that their theory clashes with the ordinary thought that we live in a world that is in constant flux. Our basic interactions with the environment around us seem to require that we believe that time passes. In this paper, I take this worry seriously, and I try to give an account of our ordinary attitudes with respect to time that is both respectful of common sense and compatible with the B-theory.
G. Viera. Time and the unity of consciousness.
In this paper I develop a deflationary account of the unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness, this phenomenon that has puzzled philosophers and scientists of consciousness, this aspect of our experience which has in many ways seemed recalcitrant to naturalistic explanation, is nothing more than a feature of how we represent events, including mental events, as unfolding in time. In defending this proposal, I will show how causal reasoning principles are active in our representation of complex event structure, and therefore, these causal reasoning principles underpin the unity of consciousness.
------------
For inquiries, please write to [email protected]
This workshop, sponsored by the Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies and open to the public, will explore these and related, fascinating questions in the philosophy and cognitive science of time. The workshop will also host the second Distinguished Hang Seng Centre Public Lecture.
Programme
(Each talk will last 45 minutes, followed by a 45-minute Q&A session).
10:30-12:00. Giuliano Torrengo (Università degli Studi di Milano).
“What does it mean to believe that time does not pass?”
12:00-13:30. Lunch break.
13:30-15:00. Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris).
“3A perception: Anticipatory, affective, action-oriented”.
[Distinguished Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies Public Lecture]
15:00-15:15. Coffee Break.
15:15-16:45. Gerardo Viera (University of Sheffield).
“Time and the unity of consciousness”.
Abstracts
F. de Vignemont. 3A perception: Anticipatory, affective, action-oriented.
The future location of the potential manifestation of a dispositional property is typically left indeterminate: the fragile glass may break at any time, given the right circumstances. Its fragility has to do with the possibility of its breaking, not with a specific event of breaking in the future. Likewise, when one thinks of lions as dangerous to humans, one believes that they can kill us, but this evaluation remains detached from any temporal location. However, when an impala sees a lion approaching, it does not respond to a timeless notion of danger, merely representing that the lion can kill. The impala anticipates that it will be killed if it doesn’t run away. In this talk, I will explore the role of both affective and perceptual anticipations in threat perception and argue that seeing danger is oriented towards the future qua the future.
G. Torrengo. What does it mean to believe that time does not pass?
Traditionally, passage antirealists (aka B-theorists) have refused to take seriously their opponents’ complaints that their theory clashes with the ordinary thought that we live in a world that is in constant flux. Our basic interactions with the environment around us seem to require that we believe that time passes. In this paper, I take this worry seriously, and I try to give an account of our ordinary attitudes with respect to time that is both respectful of common sense and compatible with the B-theory.
G. Viera. Time and the unity of consciousness.
In this paper I develop a deflationary account of the unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness, this phenomenon that has puzzled philosophers and scientists of consciousness, this aspect of our experience which has in many ways seemed recalcitrant to naturalistic explanation, is nothing more than a feature of how we represent events, including mental events, as unfolding in time. In defending this proposal, I will show how causal reasoning principles are active in our representation of complex event structure, and therefore, these causal reasoning principles underpin the unity of consciousness.
------------
For inquiries, please write to [email protected]